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and Funds 
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Introduction 
The Mediterranean climate and the 
Mediterranean region are like a model for 
the whole world.1 
 
The Mediterranean is one of the four 
regions on the planet most vulnerable to 
climate change. An increase in annual mean 
temperatures of between 2.2 to 5.5 degrees 
C and extreme weather events, such as heat 
                                                 
*
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College of Europe 
(Natolin Campus, Poland). 
1
 Author’s interview with a high-ranked official in the 
Secretariat of the United Nations Environment 
Programme – Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP 
MAP), Athens, August 2012. 
waves and intense droughts, are key factors 
that will have a direct impact upon the 
whole region. Moreover, sea level rise is 
expected to increase by fifty per cent more 
than the average global estimate by the end 
of this century (IPCC, 2014).  
 
As a regional space, it includes developed, 
industrialized countries in the north (EU 
members and EU candidate countries) 
emitting significant greenhouse gas 
emissions, and developing countries in the 
south, located in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean coasts of the Middle East, 
with an insignificant contribution to global 
warming. Southern Mediterranean 
countries (SMCs) are non-Annex I countries 
of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), without 
greenhouse gas emission reduction 
commitments. On the other hand, the EU 
and its member states are Annex I parties of 
the UNFCCC, with significant greenhouse 
gas emission reduction commitments and 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. These 
different positions vis-à-vis climate change 
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generate different priorities: whereas the 
main priority for SMCs tends to be 
adaptation to climate change, the EU’s main 
priority is the mitigation of greenhouse 
gases and the development of renewable 
energies (Katsaris, 2015).  
 
Climate change in the Mediterranean is 
governed through dense, complex, and at 
times contradictory structures of 
overlapping institutional frameworks 
(Cardwell, 2011). The primary drivers of 
climate change initiatives are the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the EU. UNEP-led cooperation tends to 
focus more on environmental issues such as 
pollution reduction, wastewater treatment, 
oil spills, and coastal zone management in 
the Mediterranean. For example, the 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) Protocol has been the first regional 
protocol aiming at establishing a regulatory 
framework for the protection of the 
Mediterranean coastline. On the other 
hand, EU-led initiatives, such as the Union 
for the Mediterranean, pay attention to 
both policy areas, yet with clearer market 
incentives in the mitigation sector, through 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP). In 
particular, MSP aspires to establish 
regulatory approximation between the two 
shores on solar energy and to develop a 
Mediterranean-wide renewable energy and 
energy efficiency market. In contrast, the 
Depollution of the Mediterranean project is 
projected to tackle sea water pollution and 
address climate change adaptation through 
capacity-building in SMCs.  
 
However, the Secretariats of UNEP 
Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP) 
and UfM face several challenges in terms of 
generating and sustaining regional 
cooperation in the issue-areas of renewable 
energy and water depollution: The overlap 
between different regional and national 
programmes of the United Nations and the 
EU towards SMCs generates fragmentation 
in regional efforts towards effective climate 
change governance. Also, both policy areas 
lack tangible financial commitments that 
would support long-term infrastructure 
projects, be it electricity interconnections or 
the construction of dams. Market prospects 
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are mainly offered bilaterally through the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
focus most on renewable energies (Fritzche 
et al., 2011; Katsaris, 2014).  
 
It is against this backdrop that this paper 
seeks to understand the extent to which 
UNEP MAP and UfM Secretariats are 
capable of establishing cooperation over 
interregional climate-related projects in the 
Mediterranean and offer an integrated 
response to this growing phenomenon. To 
this end, the paper briefly provides an 
overview of the two institutions and their 
current efforts to advance climate change 
governance in the region. It then outlines 
the complex institutional setting of the 
multiple (Euro-) Mediterranean political and 
technical fora and their programmes as 
regards climate change policy. The third 
section analyses the challenges for the two 
secretariats in achieving interregional 
climate change cooperation. The paper 
finally assesses the 2011 EU initiatives, 
namely the revised ENP and the Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, 
through the prism of regional climate 
change governance and concludes with 
some final remarks.  
 
This paper contributes to the unexplored 
policy field of climate change governance in 
the Mediterranean. It benefits from several 
field research face-to-face interviews with 
various European, UNEP, UfM, Moroccan 
and Algerian officials during the period 
between May 2012 and June 2013 for the 
doctorate thesis ‘Europeanization and 
Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern 
Neighbourhood: The European 
Commission’s Relations with Morocco and 
 Algeria on Climate Change Policy’. 
  
The UNEP MAP, the Union for the 
Mediterranean and Climate Change 
Governance: A Brief Overview 
The United Nations Environment 
Programme - Mediterranean Action Plan 
(UNEP MAP) is a much celebrated regional 
initiative, dating back to the 1970s with the 
entry into force of the Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
against Pollution (from here onwards 
Barcelona Convention) and its protocols. 
UNEP MAP emerged from the growing 
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concern among several Mediterranean 
countries about the level of pollution in the 
region (Haas, 1990). The Mediterranean 
Action Plan was the first ever regional seas 
program under UNEP coordination. 
 
UNEP MAP originally involved sixteen 
coastal Mediterranean countries: the 
northern Mediterranean countries (France, 
Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, and Cyprus), the 
southern Mediterranean countries (Egypt, 
Israel, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Algeria2) and the European 
Community. Today, the Convention counts 
twenty-one contracting parties including 
the European Union, the Western Balkans, 
Monaco, Turkey, and all North African and 
coastal Middle Eastern countries (except for 
the Palestinian territories and Jordan). The 
Convention was initially implemented in 
1976 and was amended for the first time in 
2004. As an umbrella convention, the 
Barcelona Convention constitutes the legal 
component of the UNEP MAP framework 
and obliges the contracting parties ‘to take 
all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, 
                                                 
2
 Full member since 1980. 
combat, and to the fullest possible extent 
eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean 
Sea Area’ (Article 1, par. 1). Seven Protocols 
complete the MAP structure, ranging from 
pollution from ships and exploration, land-
based sources and biodiversity to 
integrated coastal zone management. 
 
Although climate change was part of the 
discussions in several technical meetings, 
mainly as a response to international 
summits on environment, it was mainly 
introduced in 2008 at the Almería 
Conference of Parties (CoP). The 
contracting parties decided to extend the 
system of protocols of the Convention by 
developing a framework for the protection 
of the Mediterranean coasts. The 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) Protocol – the latest Protocol of the 
convention, which was signed in 2008 and 
entered into force in March 2011 – 
addresses matters such as natural hazards 
(Article 22), coastal erosion (Article 23) and 
responses to natural disasters (Article 24) 
that highlight the issue of climate change. A 
Protocol was considered a suitable option 
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as it would be legally binding on all parties, 
and regulations could be filtered by state 
administrations across the region.3 
Moreover, a legally binding document could 
better address the problem, because 
seventy percent of the region’s population 
lives on the coastline which is expected to 
be severely affected by the adverse effects 
of climate change, such as desertification, 
water salinization and extreme weather 
events (IPCC, 2014).  
 
National focal points are engaged in 
regional meetings through Regional Activity 
Centres (RACs). RACs are an integral part of 
UNEP MAP structures and refer to 
decentralized monitoring bodies of the 
Convention, which are supervised by the 
MAP Secretariat and focus on various 
environmental issues related to the 
Barcelona Convention (biodiversity, oil 
pollution, ICZM etc). Technical focus groups 
in each RAC assess the progress of the 
Convention in each sector and are in close 
collaboration with the MAP Secretariat and 
                                                 
3
 Author’s interview with  
the national focal points.4 In relation to 
climate change issues there are two RACs: 
the Priority Action Programme RAC 
(PAP/RAC) in Split, Croatia and the Blue Plan 
RAC (BP/RAC) in Sophia Antipolis, France. 
PAP/RAC focuses mainly on ICZM issues and 
other climate-related ones such as water 
scarcity, desalination plants, carbon capture 
and storage, and promotes financial 
cooperation with GEF and the World Bank 
in regional projects such as 
MedPartnership-ICZM. PAP/RAC organizes 
regional meetings, training for regional and 
international actors, and conferences on 
exchanging best practices and discussing 
studies and reports. The Blue Plan is mainly 
a clearing house of regional and national 
reports in relation to climate change, 
sustainable development, agriculture, water 
management, tourism etc.  
 
Apart from UNEP MAP, in 2008 the UfM 
added another layer in Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. This EU initiative aimed to build 
on the EMP and was supposed to give a 
                                                 
4
 Author’s interview with a UNEP MAP Secretariat 
official, Athens, August 2012. 
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new impetus to regional cooperation 
mainly through the pursuit of technical 
projects (Bicchi, 2011). One key innovation 
of this initiative was the establishment of a 
Secretariat with a separate legal 
personality. The UfM Secretariat was 
mandated to collaborate with already 
existing regional institutions, such as UNEP 
MAP, the European Commission and other 
international actors on functional technical 
projects of Mediterranean-wide interest. To 
this end, the Secretariat is responsible for 
promoting the financing of UfM projects, in 
collaboration with regional and 
international financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank and the European 
Commission, and ensuring their successful 
implementation (Katsaris, forthcoming). 
 
Projects related to climate change are at 
the forefront of the whole initiative as 
included in the 2008 UfM Paris Declaration 
(UfM, 2008). The Mediterranean Solar Plan 
(MSP) and the Depollution of the 
Mediterranean are considered to be two 
highly visible regional projects with explicit 
climate change mitigation and adaptation 
ambitions. The MSP aspires to develop a 
regional legislative framework among 
participating countries in the renewable 
energy sector, mainly for solar energy. In 
particular, the MSP foresaw the 
development of 20 GW of new renewable 
energy production capacities, and the 
achievement of significant energy savings 
across the Mediterranean by 2020. In 
contrast, the Depollution of the 
Mediterranean project is the second UfM 
project with a climate change focus related 
to environmental protection, water 
management and adaptation to climate 
change. The project intends to offer 
capacity-building in SMCs from regional and 
international funds using mainly European 
and international expertise. 
 
As regards the MSP, climate change 
mitigation was seen as a functional policy 
sector that could generate dialogue and 
visible results in the region’s natural 
potential in solar and wind sources of 
energy (Bicchi, 2011). Energy production 
based on sustainable sources of energy 
could reduce the increasing energy demand 
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in both shores of the Mediterranean. Green 
electricity production could also diversify 
the region’s energy mix with the 
establishment of agreed rules on a Euro-
Mediterranean renewable energy market 
and the deployment of relevant 
technologies. However, the process has 
been slow and the Secretariat has yet to 
deliver tangible results across the region. 
Between 2010 and 2014, several expert and 
technical meetings took place to prepare a 
Master Plan for the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan (MSP). The project ‘Paving the Way for 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan’ (PWMSP) is 
the instrument that finances related 
meetings and feasibility studies across the 
region. The completion of the Master Plan 
was initially set for 2011. However, because 
of the Arab uprisings, the Joint Committee 
of MSP national experts finalized the 
technical work on the Master Plan on 21 
February 2013 in Barcelona.  
 
Nevertheless, energy ministers did not 
manage to reach a unanimous consensus on 
11 December 2013 at the UfM Ministerial 
Meeting on Energy in Brussels where the 
document was supposed to be launched. 
While the ministers supported the 
development of a regional electricity 
market and the role of the Secretariat in 
this regard, SMCs were sceptical concerning 
the EU’s willingness to establish 
mechanisms to manage the costs and risks 
of large-scale projects (PWMSP, 2014, 
p.133). They also stress the absence of 
international sponsors willing to absorb 
extra costs from pilot or large-scale 
projects. In response to the failure of the 
UfM ministerial meeting, it was decided to 
launch the ‘Extended Technical Committee’ 
and national representatives pointed 
instead towards more research on energy 
efficiency options. Thus the committee is 
expected to suggest options for renewable 
energy markets and identify related 
projects to international funding 
institutions. Currently, however, the only 
project related to the MSP is the 
Ouarzazate project in Morocco that benefits 
from financial support of the 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). 
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Climate change adaptation is an integral 
part of the Depollution of the 
Mediterranean project, mainly in the 
context of water management and 
desalination plants. Water scarcity is a key 
challenge among all SMCs because of the 
growing effects of desertification, water 
salinization and extreme weather events 
affecting the densely populated coastal 
urban centres across SMCs. Since the early 
stages of the project in 2011, the 
environmental division of the UfM            
Secretariat aimed to build links with similar 
projects in the region. UNEP MAP was an 
obvious choice as it constitutes a regional 
environmental setting that allows for 
uninterrupted technical discussions on the 
depollution of the Sea. In addition, the 
Secretariat started participating in the 
UNEP MAP Conference of Parties. Also, 
since December 2013 it has deepened its 
relationship with UNEP MAP by signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
Lately, the Secretariat is engaged in the 
promotion of regional dialogue and 
awareness-raising on the environment and 
climate change through several regional 
meetings co-organized with the European 
Commission. For example, the Secretariat 
managed to organize its first ever UfM 
ministerial meeting on the environment and 
climate change in May 2014, which, in fact, 
was the first Euro-Mediterranean 
ministerial meeting on environment since 
September 2006. However, the meeting 
failed to identify concrete sources of funds 
for coastal zone management, construction 
of dams and sustainable agriculture. 
Moreover, there are still no concrete 
adaptation projects that can be targeted or 
filtered through UNEP MAP. 
 
Regional Differentiation and Multiple 
Mandates  
Climate change policy in the Mediterranean 
is pursued in multiple diplomatic fora that 
bring together various states, non-state 
actors and regional and international 
institutions (Katsaris, forthcoming). These 
diplomatic fora mainly offer financial and 
expertise incentives that intend to develop 
administrative and regulatory capacities in 
SMCs. UNEP and the EU are the primary 
drivers of climate change cooperation in the 
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region. Yet, fragmented membership, 
various mandates and different incentives 
offered in each climate policy area 
contribute to considerable complexity in 
the Mediterranean (Cardwell, 2011). To put 
things into perspective, the number of 
actors is broad and membership is 
diversified. For example, the United Nations 
Environment Programme Mediterranean 
Action Plan (UNEP MAP) comprises twenty-
one contracting parties including the EU, 
the Western Balkans, Monaco, Turkey and 
all coastal North African and Middle Eastern 
countries (except for the Palestinian 
territories and Jordan). Instead, 
membership under the UfM is extended to 
forty-three countries, whilst the ENP is 
primarily structured along a bilateral basis, 
i.e. a one-by-one rationale.  
 
Different mandates further exacerbate 
fragmentation in the region (Katsaris, 
forthcoming). Climate change policy is not 
the overriding focus of governance in either 
UNEP-led or EU-led processes. In particular, 
UNEP MAP mainly addresses environmental 
issues, such as pollution reduction, 
wastewater treatment and oil spills. In 
contrast, the main focus of the then Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was on 
the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area and greater liberalization 
of markets, along with cultural and political 
cooperation. Although energy and climate 
change formed an integral part of the 
cooperation, they did not appear high in 
regional and bilateral dialogue and 
programmes (Costa, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the EU is the main donor in 
the region with comprehensive market 
access and expertise offered to SMCs. Yet, 
its initiatives are more comprehensive in 
renewable energies than in climate change 
adaptation and are mainly filtered through 
the bilateral channel of the ENP. In the 
framework of the ENP, the EU offers the 
prospect of market access to reform-willing 
SMCs and green electricity exports to the 
EU in exchange for regulatory convergence 
to the 2009/28/EC Directive (Article 9). 
Willing SMCs can engage in bilateral 
relations with the Commission in order to 
bring their legislation closer to the 
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2009/28/EC Directive. Such market 
prospects are also supported by long-term 
legislative advice and targeted technical 
projects, to narrow administrative and 
regulatory gaps (de Arce et al., 2012).  
 
EU climate change adaptation rules are less 
embedded in the EU acquis itself and do not 
feature high in ENP agreements with each 
SMC. In addition, their regulatory 
framework is not followed by prospective 
EU market access or even comprehensive 
expertise offers, as in the case of renewable 
energies (European Commission, 2013). On 
the other hand, UNEP MAP offers expertise 
and capacity development in each SMC 
through regional programmes, mainly as 
regards climate change adaptation and 
integrated coastal zone management. 
However, its budgetary restrictions allow 
only for a limited number of capacity-
building and information-sharing events 
across the region.5 Given its highly 
decentralized structure across the 
                                                 
5
 Author’s interview with UNEP MAP official, 
Athens, August 2012; author’s interview with 
president of Euro-Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 
2012. 
Mediterranean, various research centres 
and specialized projects depend on the 
budgetary contributions of the hosting 
countries. As a result, assistance focuses 
mostly on the hosting country’s needs 
rather than on regional or sub-regional 
technical interests.6 
 
Politics and Financial Challenges for 
Climate Change Governance in the 
Mediterranean 
So, what are the main challenges that 
regional institutions, such as the 
Secretariats of UNEP MAP and UfM, face in 
governing climate change in the region? 
With respect to climate change mitigation, 
there are several technical and political 
challenges that impede the development of 
a coherent Euro-Mediterranean renewable 
energy framework and thus the success of 
the MSP. First, green electricity imports 
from SMCs by EU members are not meant 
to be included in the energy markets of EU 
members before 2020 (Katsaris, 
forthcoming). The National Renewable 
Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) of Spain, 
                                                 
6
 Author’s interview with senior UNEP official, 
Athens, August 2012. 
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France, Italy and Greece do not foresee the 
purchase renewable energy surpluses from 
SMCs. In particular, the Spanish NREAP 
states that there are limited physical 
interconnections between Spain and the 
rest of the EU (France) that can afford the 
increase of electricity exchanges up to 2GW 
‘on the basis of infrastructural 
reinforcements that have yet to be defined’ 
(Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and 
Commerce, 2010, p. 139). 
 
In addition, the current legal framework of 
the article nine of the European Directive 
2009/28/EC allows only for joint ventures 
on renewable energies projects in the 
Mediterranean. However, it rules out the 
possibility of statistical transfers from SMCs. 
Statistical transfer is a permit scheme 
where an EU member can buy renewable 
energy units from another EU member 
state with renewable energy surplus so that 
the former complies with its 2020 EU 
renewable energy targets. Such permits are 
only available among EU member states 
and exclude third countries, such as SMCs.  
Furthermore, energy producing SMCs (i.e. 
Algeria, Egypt) are reluctant to engage in 
the development of renewable energies as 
the sector touches upon sensitive 
sovereignty issues, which are related to oil 
rents from hydrocarbon exportats and 
entrenched interests with the Arab world. 
EU energy relations with SMCs have 
traditionally focused more on conventional 
energy resources, such as oil and natural 
gas, than on electricity exports. A shift to an 
alternative energy relationship with Europe 
will incur revenue losses for local state 
elites in terms of energy rents, and even 
jeopardize their political regimes (Katsaris, 
2014). In addition, Arab Mediterranean 
countries have close economic, energy and 
cultural relations with the oil-producing 
countries of the Gulf.7 Traditionally close 
energy relations based on conventional 
energy sources may be put at stake in case 
SMC’s shift their energy model towards 
renewable energies.  
 
                                                 
7
 Author’s interview with president of a Euro-
Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 2012. 
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On the other hand, climate change 
adaptation is a policy sector that requires 
significant amounts of funds that are not 
currently available in the region. For 
example, one of the UfM priority projects 
has been the Gaza Desalination project. 
Despite several appeals to international 
funding institutions, such as the European 
Investment Bank, the World Bank and the 
Islamic Development Bank, the project has 
yet to secure funds to support the 
Palestinian water administration towards 
the implementation of the project that was 
scheduled to be finalised by 2016.  
 
Similarly, the absence of funding impedes 
the development of less capacitated 
administrations from SMCs to integrate 
related regulations in their systems. As Slim 
and Scovazzi (2009, p. 47) argue, most 
SMCs have no specific tools for monitoring 
progress on the prevention of or adaptation 
to climate change. In addition, several SMCs 
have yet to introduce national plans on 
mitigating climate change, because other 
most pressing issues, such as poverty, 
unemployment, feature higher in the 
domestic agendas.8 Although according to 
article 3 paragraph 2 of the Convention 
contracting parties have to report every 
two years on national policies and measures 
regarding the Convention, most SMCs do 
not have the necessary resources to deliver 
those reports.9  
 
Apart from administrative and financial 
issues, there are other reasons for the 
limited implementation of the ICZM, 
especially in SMCs. According to Slim and 
Scovazzi (2009, p. 22), ‘the main reason of 
delays in the ratification and 
implementation processes is probably the 
advanced character of the protocols from 
the point of view of the protection of the 
environment’. Most SMCs do not have the 
technical means to respond to the 
measures that several protocols impose. As 
a result, they prefer either not to proceed 
to the ratification or to wait for EU 
assistance. For SMCs, the role of the EU is 
significant, since financial and technical 
                                                 
8
 Author’s interview with Commission official, 
Algiers, April 2013. 
9
 Author’s interview with president of a Euro-
Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 2012. 
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assistance, the sharing of best practices, 
training of administrative personnel and the 
transfer of modern technology are 
necessary elements for the effective 
implementation of the Barcelona 
commitments. Capacity-development 
programmes can better frame a policy 
problem, in order to persuade others about 
the need for, and possibilities of, action 
(Bulkeley and Newell, 2010, p. 61).  
 
However, as it will be argued below, the EU 
pays less attention to climate change 
adaptation and the advancement of 
adaptation rules through capacity-
development programmes. The 2013 EU 
Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change 
currently frames the regulatory framework 
of EU adaptation policy (European 
Commission, 2013). The main focus of the 
strategy is on the integration of adaptation 
considerations in the EU’s agriculture, 
fisheries, maritime and cohesion policies 
and the development of national 
adaptation plans by EU members (European 
Commission, 2013, pp. 4–9). However, the 
external aspect of adaptation to climate 
change is not included in the strategy. 
Although the Mediterranean is 
characterised as being particularly 
vulnerable to climate change impacts, there 
is no concrete action that explains how 
adaptation will be introduced into the EU’s 
external policies (European Commission, 
2013, p. 5). Finally, there are no market-
making incentives for third countries as 
compared to renewable energies, similar to 
the 2009/28/EC Directive. 
 
Enter ENP and Mitigation Priorities 
In addition, the EU prioritises closer 
bilateral relations with reform-willing SMCs 
at the expense of regional structures. As a 
result, regional institutions face the 
challenge of growing regional 
fragmentation. Differentiated bilateral 
relations are critical for the EU in order to 
manage its relations with its immediate 
neighbours and can provide these countries 
with ‘tailor-made’ solutions to their needs 
and capacities (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 
2005). In other words, those willing 
neighbours that wish to reform according to 
the legislative framework of the EU’s single 
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market would be rewarded with aid, 
technical assistance and closer political and 
economic ties with EU member states. 
Those who lag behind would not be given 
such rewards (Pace, 2007, p. 669). To that 
end, the Commission responded to this with 
the establishment of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. This 
policy was based on the concept of ‘sharing 
everything with the Union but (EU) 
institutions’, whose relations with this ‘ring 
of friends’ would depend on the latters’ 
performance and the political will on each 
side. The main reward of the policy was to 
be a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and 
prospective mobility and trade 
liberalization, regulated by EU rules 
(Vincentz, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, bilateral relations under an 
Action Plan offer a more targeted 
framework of cooperation on climate 
change mitigation for a reform-willing SMC. 
Bilateral ENP agreements require SMCs to 
bring their legislation closer to the EU in 
return for market access, as per the 
2009/28/EC Directive and prospects for 
electricity exports to the EU. Market 
incentives are less clear in adaptation 
issues, given the loose EU acquis in this field 
(Katsaris, 2014, pp. 114-115). In addition, 
bilateral relations offer insulated relations 
from the highly politicised regional 
framework caused by the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and can promote implementation 
of tailored reforms through comprehensive 
capacity development programmes (Bailey 
and de Propris, 2004). 
 
In response to the 2011 Arab uprisings and 
growing political instability, the EU 
launched two new initiatives towards SMCs 
in March and May 2011 respectively: The 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity with the southern 
Mediterranean and A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood. Bilaterally 
differentiated relations are even further 
promoted at the core of Euro-Med 
relations. Both initiatives argue for greater 
EU support for reform-willing SMCs, while 
EU support will be reallocated for SMCs that 
stall or retrench on agreed reform plans.  
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At the same time, the documents envisage 
an EU-Mediterranean partnership on 
production and management of solar and 
wind sources of energy through the 
establishment of an ‘EU-Southern 
Mediterranean Energy Community’ in the 
medium to long run (European Commission, 
2011a, pp. 9-10; European Commission, 
2011b, p. 10). In particular, joint renewable 
energy investments in SMCs could develop 
such partnership provided that the 
appropriate market perspective is created 
for electricity imports. Instead, climate 
change adaptation only features in the form 
of envisaged contributions towards 
international climate change negotiations. 
Furthermore, regional cooperation through 
UfM projects, such as the MSP and the de-
pollution of the Mediterranean, remains 
relevant, while the UfM Secretariat is 
earmarked as the most appropriate 
institution that can organise effective and 
result-oriented regional cooperation 
supported by the EU.  
 
However, after the first three years of the 
implementation of these initiatives, the 
UfM remained rather unchanged in its 
substance, while UNEP MAP is still unable 
to expand its funding scope from 
international donors. One of the few 
changes has been the UfM co-presidency, in 
which the Commission now represents the 
EU. However, bilateral relations under ENP 
are more advanced than regional 
structures, mainly through several 
Advanced Partnerships and renewed ENP 
Action Plans with reform-willing SMCs, such 
as Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. 
Furthermore, although political instability 
hampers to a certain extent regional fora, 
the EU has yet to identify how in practice 
‘differentiated and gradual’ bilateral 
relations with each SMC could advance the 
idea of an EU-Mediterranean renewable 
energy market and how renewable energy 
will be ‘managed in SMCs and then 
exported to Europe’, since physical 
interconnections are only available 
between Morocco and Spain. The current 
capacity does not allow for larger electricity 
volumes or even transportation towards 
France.  
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Moreover, the Neighbourhood Investment 
Facility is the only funding source that partly 
covers certain regional investment needs 
(Katsaris, forthcoming). Yet, its operations 
currently support only the Ouarzazate 
project in Morocco, while UNEP MAP 
operations are only based on limited 
financial contributions from the EU Budget. 
Also, the EU has yet to identify feasible 
financial sources and identify robust 
commitments for long-term infrastructure 
investments and electricity 
interconnections. As a result, network-
building and exchange of best practices 
seem to be the only viable means of 
regional cooperation in both policy areas, 
whilst at the same time bilateral 
differentiation is not in line with region-
wide coordination. In addition, networks in 
regional contexts can allow for information-
sharing and trust-building among experts 
and develop routinized dialogue over 
technical matters. For example, UNEP MAP 
processes have a long record of 
uninterrupted discussions and technical 
cooperation, through which the EU wishes 
to benefit by aligning with its structures and 
encouraging similar projects, such as the 
UfM de-pollution of the Mediterranean and 
the EU-led programme Horizon 2020 on the 
depollution of the Mediterranean (Barbé et 
al. 2009).  
 
In contrast, networks in bilateral settings 
are different from regional processes.  
Market prospects play a significant role in 
this case. For example, while Algeria 
considers EU mitigation rules to be highly 
politicised, it encourages instead network-
building on climate adaptation projects. In 
contrast, Morocco has a rather indifferent 
attitude towards the offer of expertise from 
that of the Commission over adaptation, 
despite being its immediate climate 
priority.10 Its interest to converge with the 
2009/28/EC directive on renewable 
energies offers strong market incentives for 
Morocco to allow network-building and 
administrative advice from the EU.  
 
Conclusions 
Overall, climate change governance is 
advanced at variable speeds in the 
                                                 
10
 Author’s interview with Moroccan official, Rabat 
and London, June and October 2012. 
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Mediterranean. Regional institutions can 
bring together regional actors to build 
common regulatory frameworks in both 
policy areas. However, they suffer from 
limited funds and regional political 
problems that impede their potential. 
Instead, bilateral EU initiatives seem to 
offer market prospects and more targeted 
capacity-building grants than regional 
structures; yet they mainly do so regarding 
climate change mitigation in reform-willing 
– and most often energy importing – SMCs 
with functional interests in renewable 
energies.  
 
Regarding climate change mitigation, 
political and technical challenges in the 
Mediterranean seem to reduce the 
potential of developing a Euro-
Mediterranean regulatory framework on 
renewable energies under the MSP. The 
Mediterranean is a highly differentiated 
region on energy, as there are countries 
that have abundant energy resources and 
export energy to Europe, and on the other 
hand the majority are energy dependent 
countries (sometimes up to 90 percent). 
While for the latter an integrated regulatory 
framework on renewable energies could 
even serve their option to reduce energy 
dependence, for the energy supplying SMCs 
MSP is considered as a threat. Such a shift 
towards a different energy future may 
compromise their domestic energy rents 
and the focus of their economy to a market 
that may reduce their revenues. On top of 
that, green electricity imports from SMCs 
are not an immediate priority for EU 
members. As a result, although MSP could 
enhance the natural potential of the region 
towards the production of green electricity 
and reduce the energy dependence of 
SMCs, political and other technical issues 
impede the UfM Secretariat from achieving 
progress in this project. 
 
 
Furthermore, there are no concrete sources 
of funds that can manage to address needs 
for technology transfers for climate change 
mitigation projects on one hand, and the 
construction of dams and other adaptation 
projects on the other. The absence of 
financial commitments impedes even the 
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mere functioning of institutions, such as 
UNEP MAP, constraining its potential to 
promote capacity-building projects in less 
capacitated SMCs (Slim and Scovazzi, 2009).  
 
As a result, administrative incapacities and 
limited funding for UNEP MAP reduce the 
potential for comprehensive Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation on ICZM issues 
under the Barcelona Convention.  
 
Finally, the prioritisation of bilateral 
relations under ENP undermines 
interregional climate change governance. 
Market prospects under ENP in the form of 
future green electricity exports to Europe 
motivates reform-willing SMCs to engage in 
bilateral technical discussions with the 
European Commission and benefit from 
capacity-development programmes. With 
the advent of the Arab uprisings, the EU 
stresses even further its interest in closer 
differentiated relations with each SMC. The 
on-going revision of the ENP could adjust 
these asymmetries and prioritise a more 
balanced approach that can shape an 
inclusive role for regional secretariats in 
order to narrow existing governing gaps and 
address climate priorities and financial 
needs on both shores of the 
Mediterranean. 
 
 
References 
Bailey, D. and de Propris, L. 2004. A bridge 
too Phare? EU pre-accession aid and 
capacity-building in the candidate 
countries. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 77–98. 
Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz, A., Johansson-
Nogués, E., Natorski, M. and Sabiote, M.A., 
2009. Which Rules Shape EU External 
Governance? Patterns of Rule Selection in 
Foreign and Security Policies. Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 
834–852. 
Bicchi, Federica. 2011. The Union for the 
Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations. 
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 3–
19. 
Bulkeley, H. and P. Newell 2010. Governing 
Climate Change. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 23 
 
Cardwell, P.J. 2011. EuroMed, European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for 
the Mediterranean: Overlapping policy 
frames in the EU’s governance of the 
Mediterranean. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 219–241. 
Costa, O. 2010. Convergence on the fringe: 
The environmental dimension of Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation. Mediterranean 
Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 149–168. 
De Arce, R., Mahía, R., Medina, E. and 
Escribano, G. 2012. A Simulation of the 
Economic Impact of Renewable Energy 
Development in Morocco. Energy Policy, 
vol. 46, pp. 335–45. 
Del Sarto, R.A. and Schumacher, T. 2005. 
From EMP to ENP: What’s at stake with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy towards 
the southern Mediterranean?. European 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 10, pp. 17–38. 
Escribano, G. 2010. Convergence towards 
differentiation: The case of Mediterranean 
energy corridors. Mediterranean Politics, 
vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 211–29. 
European Commission 2013. An EU strategy 
on adaptation to climate change. COM 
(2013) 216 final, Brussels, 16 April 2013. 
European Commission 2002. Report of the 
first five years of implementation of SMAP, 
Office for official publications of the 
European Communities L-2985, 
Luxembourg, June, 2002. 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument 2014. Paving the way for the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan – Final report. 
ENPI 2010/248-486, March. Available: 
http://www.pavingtheway-msp.com/0-
PWMSP-Final-Report-March-2011.pdf 
(accessed 19 March 2015). 
Fritzsche, K., Zelji, D. & Tänzler, D. 2011. 
The relevance of global energy governance 
for Arab countries: The case of Morocco. 
Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 8, pp. 4497–506. 
Haas, Peter M. 1990. Saving the 
Mediterranean: The Politics of International 
Environmental Cooperation. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Horizon 2020 2014. Work programme for 
the second phase of the Horizon 2020 
initiative for a cleaner Mediterranean 
(2015-2020). Available: 
http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/H2020workprogr
amme-EN.pdf (accessed 19 March 2015). 
 24 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2014. Climate change 2014: Impacts, 
adaptation, and vulnerability. Part B: 
Regional aspects. Contribution of working 
group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge, UK and New York, USA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Katsaris, A. forthcoming. ‘Managing Climate 
Change in the Mediterranean: The Union 
for the Mediterranean and the Challenge of 
Fragmentation’, Mediterranean Politics, 
doi10.1080/13629395.2015.1046267. 
 
Katsaris, A. 2015. The Climate Challenge in 
the South Mediterranean. Open Democracy, 
16 January. Available: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/angelos-
katsaris/climate-challenge-in-south-
mediterranean (accessed: 19 March 2015). 
 
Katsaris, A. 2014. Europeanization and 
Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern 
Neighbourhood: The European 
Commission’s Relations with Morocco and 
Algeria over Climate Change Policy. PhD 
Thesis. Southampton, UK: Department of 
Politics and International Relations, 
University of Southampton). 
 
Pace, M. 2007. Norm Shifting from EMP to 
ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the 
South?. Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 659−675. 
Slim, H. and Scovazzi, T. 2009. Study of the 
Current Status of Ratification, 
Implementation and Compliance with 
Maritime Agreements and Conventions 
Applicable to the Mediterranean Sea Basin – 
With a Specific Focus on the ENPI South 
Partner Countries. FWC Beneficiaries – LOT 
No 6, December. 
Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and 
Commerce 2010. Spain’s National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan 2011-2020, 
Available: 
http://pvtrin.eu/assets/media/PDF/EU_POL
ICIES/National%20Renewable%20Energy%2
0Action%20Plan/202.pdf (accessed 10 April 
2015). 
UNEP MAP 2008. Protocol on integrated 
coastal zone management in the 
Mediterranean. Athens: MAP Special 
Publications.  
 25 
 
Union for the Mediterranean. 2008. Joint 
Declaration of the Paris Summit for the 
Mediterranean, Paris, July 13th. 
Vincentz, V. 2007. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: An economic 
perspective. In European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Challenges for the EU – Policy 
towards the new neighbours. Edited by J. 
Varwick and K.O. Lang. Opladen [Germany]: 
Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 117–128. 
 
 
